What is the relationship between public spending and economic growth? There are many theories but the surest way to observe the real effect is to examine the historical record and compare public expenditure with private sector growth. If we look at the real data and do not rely on theories we discover that if you increase the growth of public spending you depress the economy. This relationship is so consistent that it deserves to be called a "Law" of economics:
Sydenham's Law: Significant increases in the growth of public expenditure accompany decreases in private sector growth.
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Sydenham's Law of public spending and private sector growth |
The diamond shapes due to Sydenham's Law are all over the public sector-private sector growth graphs. The historical record is crystal clear: increasing public spending does not stimulate the private sector. Look at the graphs below for the UK and US economies.
What is never seen is the theoretical "Keynesian event" where public spending increases growth. In the past 60 years the UK has had several governments that believed in the Keynesian model but Keynesian events are not observed in the UK data despite their interventions.
Here are the data for the UK for the post war period with smoothing applied (click on graphs to enlarge them):
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Graph 1: UK The effect of changes of public sector spending on the private sector |
Notice that Keynesian events are never found in the data. Keynesian interventions have either never occurred in the UK or Keynesian theory is wrong.
The smoothing in graph 1 shows that the effect is not due to reporting intervals that are out of phase. Notice how the abrupt policy change, the cut in spending in 2009-10, reversed the private sector decline. (The unsmoothed data is given in Graph 7 below and is even more convincing).
One reason why government spending fails to cause growth is that it tends to be immediately devalued by inflation. The data for change in public spending versus inflation rate show the emptiness of using loans or printing money to increase economic performance:
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Graph 2: UK: Annual increase in public spending and inflation Yellow lines: inflation %, Red: increase in public spending % |
The graph below shows the annual percentage change in public expenditure (inflation adjusted) versus growth in the private sector part of the economy in the USA since 1950:
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Graph 3: USA: The effect of changes of public sector spending on the private sector |
Sydenham's Law applies to both the US and UK economies. This is a "law" of economics because the two factors, public spending and private sector growth are tightly linked. Does public sector growth control private GDP or private GDP growth control public spending? This is discussed in Note 1 below and it seems that public spending growth controls private sector growth.
Sydenham's law also applies to Japan:
(I do not have the raw data for 2011 and 2012).
Is Keynesianism rational?
It is interesting that the coupling between public spending and private sector output occurs when the public sector is at least about 10% of GDP and requires public spending of over 15-20% to become a "Law". The USA provides an example of an economy that only reached a 10% tax take after the first world war.
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Graph 4 |
Notice that the much vaunted "New Deal" in the mid 1930s seems to have followed and possibly reduced a larger private sector recovery.
Data for the New Deal period
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Graph 5 |
Inflation | Year | GDP-US $ billion nominal | Population-US million | Total Spending -total $ billion nominal | Non public GDP | Inflation Factor 1/(1+Inf'n) | Change in Public Spending | Change in Non-Public GDP |
0.9% | 1926 | 96.949 | 116.019 | 10.780 | 86.169 | 0.991 | 0.030 | 0.065 |
-1.9% | 1927 | 95.544 | 117.775 | 11.220 | 84.324 | 1.019 | 0.061 | -0.002 |
-1.2% | 1928 | 97.365 | 119.557 | 11.440 | 85.925 | 1.012 | 0.032 | 0.031 |
0.0% | 1929 | 103.600 | 121.366 | 11.680 | 91.920 | 1.000 | 0.021 | 0.070 |
-2.7% | 1930 | 91.200 | 123.203 | 11.920 | 79.280 | 1.028 | 0.049 | -0.114 |
-8.9% | 1931 | 76.500 | 124.071 | 12.170 | 64.330 | 1.098 | 0.121 | -0.109 |
-10.3% | 1932 | 58.700 | 124.945 | 12.440 | 46.260 | 1.115 | 0.140 | -0.198 |
-5.2% | 1933 | 56.400 | 125.825 | 12.620 | 43.780 | 1.055 | 0.070 | -0.002 |
3.5% | 1934 | 66.000 | 126.712 | 12.810 | 53.190 | 0.966 | -0.019 | 0.174 |
2.6% | 1935 | 73.300 | 127.605 | 14.780 | 58.520 | 0.975 | 0.125 | 0.072 |
1.0% | 1936 | 83.800 | 128.504 | 16.760 | 67.040 | 0.990 | 0.123 | 0.134 |
3.7% | 1937 | 91.900 | 129.410 | 17.220 | 74.680 | 0.964 | -0.009 | 0.074 |
-2.0% | 1938 | 86.100 | 130.321 | 17.680 | 68.420 | 1.020 | 0.048 | -0.065 |
-1.3% | 1939 | 92.200 | 131.240 | 19.050 | 73.150 | 1.013 | 0.092 | 0.083 |
0.7% | 1940 | 101.400 | 132.165 | 20.420 | 80.980 | 0.993 | 0.064 | 0.099 |
Data: US Bureau of economic Analysis: GDP and Other Major NIPA Series, 1929–2012:II,
Notice that the improvement in private sector growth dates from 1932 but the New Deal started in 1934.
Analysis
This analysis does not mean that public spending should be slashed and slashed again. It means that public spending should be carefully controlled so that it does not suppress growth. A modest growth in public spending that is less than the growth in the private sector part of GDP should be sustainable. The UK can keep the NHS and welfare but great care must be taken not to overspend. You cannot simply spend your way out of a recession.
When there is an incipient recession government must not panic and increase public spending, in the UK, with almost 50% of the economy in the public sector, steady increases in the growth of public spending may briefly increase total GDP but they make the underlying problem worse by removing funds from the private sector. If there is an incipient recession then public spending should be kept as steady as possible to pay for welfare (or even reduced) but public sector spending growth should not be increased until private sector growth returns.
The ideal for long term economic management is probably for public spending growth to change at a rate that is sufficiently low to have a minimal impact on GDP growth, this will probably avoid most recessions.
It is probably true that government interventions smooth out some of the more extreme changes in GDP but, as will be seen below, they also cause extreme changes in the private sector. The net effect of government interventions during downturns seems to be little more than a shift of value from the productive private sector to the non-productive state sector which exacerbates the downturn in the private sector.
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Graph 6 USA GDP growth in yellow |
Governments should always have a surplus of about 3% of revenue over spending and increase revenues at a steady rate that is comparable to the long term growth in GDP with a target of spending being less than 40% of GDP.
Note 1: Does public spending control private sector growth or vice versa?
Public spending is almost certainly the causative agent.
It could be argued that public spending changes automatically with private sector growth, for instance declines in the private sector causing unemployment and hence more spending. This "automatic regulation of the economy" cannot apply where private sector growth is greater than zero because the economy is growing, there is no increase in unemployment etc. In Graph 7 below there are changes that cannot be blamed on "automatic regulation of the economy", for instance, in 1971 there is a fall and in 1972 a massive rise in public spending when growth is buoyant, the fall in public spending causes a rise in private sector growth and the rise in spending a fall in growth.
In the data for the USA there are some large increases in public spending relating to the Vietnam War that correlate with reduced private sector growth rates, in the UK there are increases in spending due to Labour's ideological stance and Keynesianism that reduce private sector growth rates. These events show that deliberate increases in the rate of change of public spending cause decreases in private sector growth.
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Graph 7: Unsmoothed UK data, notice how Brown's spending spree reduced growth. |
Public spending is clearly directly linked to private sector growth. When public spending increases taxes are usually increased to pay for the spending. These taxes remove money from the private sector and immediately reduce growth. When there are tax cuts public spending is usually reduced and the private sector benefits immediately.
If public spending is increased as a result of loans or printing money then inflation increases, depressing the private sector and reducing the value of loans. The only major exception to this pattern is Black Wednesday.
There is also a more subtle relationship between the growth of public spending and private sector growth that is due to the fact that the public sector does not trade, it does not add value. If a company supplies another company with £10 worth of goods these may produce £20 of sales for the second company and so £20 of GDP in total may be generated, if a company sells £10 of goods to the government only £10 of GDP is generated. It might be thought that £10 of GDP is better than nothing and this would indeed be true if the company that sold the goods to the government could use the money to increase its capacity and so increase sales to the private sector. However, if public sector spending increases still further it will use up this spare capacity. Any continuously increasing public spending will divert private sector resources to the public sector and may decrease private sector growth.
The influence of changes of private sector growth on public spending is less clear than the effect of public spending on the private sector part of GDP. Decreases in Private sector growth often just leave the private sector growing at a slower rate, they do not necessarily cause unemployment or economic distress. So decreases in private sector growth will not always trigger immediate increases in public spending in the form of welfare payments etc.. Increases in private sector growth are even less likely to have the observed effect on public spending. The observed relationship is that increased private sector growth is related to decreased public sector growth but the increased tax take when private GDP is growing should have the opposite effect. It is clear that the private sector growth cannot be controlling public sector growth so it is deliberate government spending that is the controlling factor: increasing public spending depresses the economy.
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See also:
Public spending and GDP
Is Labour right?
The raw data for the USA:
Inflation | Year | GDP-US $ billion nominal |
Population-US million |
Total Spending -total $ billion nominal |
Non public GDP |
0.0% | 1900 | 20.567 | 76.212 | 0.63 | 19.937 |
0.0% | 1901 | 22.269 | 77.68 | 0.64 | 21.629 |
4.0% | 1902 | 24.062 | 79.176 | 1.66 | 22.402 |
3.8% | 1903 | 25.93 | 80.701 | 1.76 | 24.17 |
0.0% | 1904 | 25.681 | 82.255 | 1.87 | 23.811 |
0.0% | 1905 | 28.788 | 83.839 | 1.99 | 26.798 |
0.0% | 1906 | 31.037 | 85.453 | 2.11 | 28.927 |
3.7% | 1907 | 33.851 | 87.099 | 2.24 | 31.611 |
-3.6% | 1908 | 30.133 | 88.776 | 2.38 | 27.753 |
0.0% | 1909 | 32.229 | 90.486 | 2.53 | 29.699 |
3.7% | 1910 | 33.423 | 92.229 | 2.68 | 30.743 |
0.0% | 1911 | 34.343 | 93.523 | 2.85 | 31.493 |
3.6% | 1912 | 37.384 | 94.836 | 3.03 | 34.354 |
2.4% | 1913 | 39.14 | 96.167 | 3.21 | 35.93 |
1.3% | 1914 | 36.479 | 97.516 | 3.49 | 32.989 |
0.9% | 1915 | 38.675 | 98.885 | 3.79 | 34.885 |
7.7% | 1916 | 49.638 | 100.273 | 4.08 | 45.558 |
17.8% | 1917 | 59.702 | 101.68 | 5.67 | 54.032 |
17.3% | 1918 | 75.835 | 103.107 | 16.76 | 59.075 |
15.2% | 1919 | 78.333 | 104.554 | 22.96 | 55.373 |
15.6% | 1920 | 88.393 | 106.022 | 11.33 | 77.063 |
-10.9% | 1921 | 73.603 | 107.626 | 10.53 | 63.073 |
-6.2% | 1922 | 73.432 | 109.254 | 9.3 | 64.132 |
1.8% | 1923 | 85.414 | 110.908 | 9.63 | 75.784 |
0.4% | 1924 | 86.947 | 112.586 | 9.98 | 76.967 |
2.4% | 1925 | 90.575 | 114.29 | 10.37 | 80.205 |
0.9% | 1926 | 96.949 | 116.019 | 10.78 | 86.169 |
-1.9% | 1927 | 95.544 | 117.775 | 11.22 | 84.324 |
-1.2% | 1928 | 97.365 | 119.557 | 11.44 | 85.925 |
0.0% | 1929 | 103.6 | 121.366 | 11.68 | 91.92 |
-2.7% | 1930 | 91.2 | 123.203 | 11.92 | 79.28 |
-8.9% | 1931 | 76.5 | 124.071 | 12.17 | 64.33 |
-10.3% | 1932 | 58.7 | 124.945 | 12.44 | 46.26 |
-5.2% | 1933 | 56.4 | 125.825 | 12.62 | 43.78 |
3.5% | 1934 | 66 | 126.712 | 12.81 | 53.19 |
2.6% | 1935 | 73.3 | 127.605 | 14.78 | 58.52 |
1.0% | 1936 | 83.8 | 128.504 | 16.76 | 67.04 |
3.7% | 1937 | 91.9 | 129.41 | 17.22 | 74.68 |
-2.0% | 1938 | 86.1 | 130.321 | 17.68 | 68.42 |
-1.3% | 1939 | 92.2 | 131.24 | 19.05 | 73.15 |
0.7% | 1940 | 101.4 | 132.165 | 20.42 | 80.98 |
5.1% | 1941 | 126.7 | 133.966 | 24.35 | 102.35 |
10.9% | 1942 | 161.9 | 135.792 | 45.58 | 116.32 |
6.0% | 1943 | 198.6 | 137.643 | 92.71 | 105.89 |
1.6% | 1944 | 219.8 | 139.519 | 109.95 | 109.85 |
2.3% | 1945 | 223 | 141.421 | 118.18 | 104.82 |
8.5% | 1946 | 222.2 | 143.349 | 79.71 | 142.49 |
14.4% | 1947 | 244.1 | 145.303 | 57.73 | 186.37 |
7.7% | 1948 | 269.1 | 147.283 | 55.08 | 214.02 |
-1.0% | 1949 | 267.2 | 149.291 | 62.71 | 204.49 |
1.1% | 1950 | 293.7 | 151.326 | 70.33 | 223.37 |
7.9% | 1951 | 339.3 | 153.917 | 75.94 | 263.36 |
2.3% | 1952 | 358.3 | 156.552 | 99.9 | 258.4 |
0.8% | 1953 | 379.3 | 159.232 | 110.05 | 269.25 |
0.3% | 1954 | 380.4 | 161.958 | 111.33 | 269.07 |
-0.3% | 1955 | 414.7 | 164.731 | 110.72 | 303.98 |
1.5% | 1956 | 437.4 | 167.551 | 115.8 | 321.6 |
3.3% | 1957 | 461.1 | 170.42 | 125.46 | 335.64 |
2.7% | 1958 | 467.2 | 173.337 | 134.73 | 332.47 |
1.0% | 1959 | 506.6 | 176.305 | 145.75 | 360.85 |
1.5% | 1960 | 526.4 | 179.323 | 151.29 | 375.11 |
1.1% | 1961 | 544.8 | 181.588 | 164.83 | 379.97 |
1.2% | 1962 | 585.7 | 183.881 | 169.5 | 416.2 |
1.2% | 1963 | 617.8 | 186.204 | 177.35 | 440.45 |
1.3% | 1964 | 663.6 | 188.555 | 189.11 | 474.49 |
1.6% | 1965 | 719.1 | 190.937 | 193.89 | 525.21 |
3.0% | 1966 | 787.7 | 193.348 | 216.22 | 571.48 |
2.8% | 1967 | 832.4 | 195.79 | 248.07 | 584.33 |
4.3% | 1968 | 909.8 | 198.263 | 277.19 | 632.61 |
5.5% | 1969 | 984.4 | 200.766 | 296.09 | 688.31 |
5.8% | 1970 | 1038.3 | 203.302 | 321.84 | 716.46 |
4.3% | 1971 | 1126.8 | 205.515 | 354.79 | 772.01 |
3.3% | 1972 | 1237.9 | 207.752 | 388.25 | 849.65 |
6.2% | 1973 | 1382.3 | 210.013 | 411.64 | 970.66 |
11.1% | 1974 | 1499.5 | 212.299 | 453.23 | 1046.27 |
9.1% | 1975 | 1637.7 | 214.609 | 550.53 | 1087.17 |
5.7% | 1976 | 1824.6 | 216.945 | 620.29 | 1204.31 |
6.5% | 1977 | 2030.1 | 219.307 | 668.17 | 1361.93 |
7.6% | 1978 | 2293.8 | 221.694 | 734.47 | 1559.33 |
11.3% | 1979 | 2562.2 | 224.107 | 809.24 | 1752.96 |
13.5% | 1980 | 2788.1 | 226.546 | 940.24 | 1847.86 |
10.3% | 1981 | 3126.8 | 228.67 | 1073.12 | 2053.68 |
6.1% | 1982 | 3253.2 | 230.815 | 1179.43 | 2073.77 |
3.2% | 1983 | 3534.6 | 232.979 | 1283.58 | 2251.02 |
4.3% | 1984 | 3930.9 | 235.164 | 1353.81 | 2577.09 |
3.5% | 1985 | 4217.5 | 237.369 | 1496.29 | 2721.21 |
1.9% | 1986 | 4460.1 | 239.595 | 1592.72 | 2867.38 |
3.7% | 1987 | 4736.4 | 241.842 | 1662.02 | 3074.38 |
4.1% | 1988 | 5100.4 | 244.11 | 1771.33 | 3329.07 |
4.8% | 1989 | 5482.1 | 246.399 | 1915.12 | 3566.98 |
5.4% | 1990 | 5800.5 | 248.71 | 2088.85 | 3711.65 |
4.2% | 1991 | 5992.1 | 251.802 | 2230.3 | 3761.8 |
3.0% | 1992 | 6342.3 | 254.933 | 2349.28 | 3993.02 |
3.0% | 1993 | 6667.4 | 258.103 | 2420.82 | 4246.58 |
2.6% | 1994 | 7085.2 | 261.312 | 2506.9 | 4578.3 |
2.8% | 1995 | 7414.7 | 264.561 | 2634.73 | 4779.97 |
2.9% | 1996 | 7838.5 | 267.85 | 2719.3 | 5119.2 |
2.3% | 1997 | 8332.4 | 271.18 | 2813.4 | 5519 |
1.6% | 1998 | 8793.5 | 274.552 | 2923.17 | 5870.33 |
2.2% | 1999 | 9353.5 | 277.966 | 3053.31 | 6300.19 |
3.4% | 2000 | 9951.5 | 282.172 | 3239.91 | 6711.59 |
2.8% | 2001 | 10286.2 | 285.082 | 3428.55 | 6857.65 |
1.6% | 2002 | 10642.3 | 287.804 | 3697.49 | 6944.81 |
2.3% | 2003 | 11142.2 | 290.326 | 3934.54 | 7207.66 |
2.7% | 2004 | 11853.3 | 293.046 | 4131.75 | 7721.55 |
3.4% | 2005 | 12623 | 295.507 | 4397.1 | 8225.9 |
3.2% | 2006 | 13377.2 | 298.109 | 4697.84 | 8679.36 |
2.9% | 2007 | 14028.7 | 300.733 | 4923.25 | 9105.45 |
3.8% | 2008 | 14369.1 | 303.38 | 5339.88 | 9029.22 |
-0.4% | 2009 | 13939 | 306.051 | 5970.04 | 7968.96 |
1.6% | 2010 | 14508.2 | 308.746 | 5942.98 | 8565.22 |
3.2% | 2011 | 14958.6 | 311.592 | 6059.65 | 8898.95 |
1.7% | 2012 | 15601.5 | 314.123 | 6231.69 | 9369.81 |
Data source
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